Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms. by Meyer, Christoph O.
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 
research output of Birkbeck College 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
 
 
Meyer, Christoph O.  (2005). Convergence towards a 
European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for 
explaining changing norms. European Journal of 
International Relations 11 (4) 523-549. 
 
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in European Journal 
of International Relations (ISSN 1354-0661). This version has been peer-
reviewed, but does not include the final publisher proof corrections, published 
layout, or pagination. © 2005 European Consortium for Political Research, 
SAGE Publications. 
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law.  
 
 
Citation for this version: 
Meyer, Christoph O.  (2005). Convergence towards a European strategic 
culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms.  
London: Birkbeck ePrints. 
Available at: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000417
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
Meyer, Christoph O.  (2005). Convergence towards a European strategic 
culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms. European 
Journal of International Relations 11 (4) 523-549. 
 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture?  
A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms1
 
 
Christoph O. Meyer 
 
Forthcoming in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No 4. 
 
Abstract 
 
The article contributes to the debate about the emergence of a European strategic culture to 
underpin a European Security and Defence Policy. Noting both conceptual and empirical 
weaknesses in the literature, the paper disaggregates the concept of strategic culture and 
focuses on four types of norms concerning the means and ends for the use of force. The study 
argues that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and 
that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989: changing threat 
perceptions, institutional socialisation, and mediatised crises learning. The combined effect of 
these mechanisms would be a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent 
in current EU countries. If the outlined hypotheses can be substantiated by further research 
the implications for ESDP are positive, especially if the EU acts cautiously in those cases, 
which involve norms that are not yet sufficiently shared across countries.  
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1. Introduction 
In the intensifying debate about the prospects for a European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), the notion of strategic culture is increasingly invoked as shorthand to highlight that 
national security and defence policies rest on deep-seated norms, beliefs and ideas about the 
appropriate use of force (Martinsen 2004, Heiselberg 2003, Rynning 2003, Longhurst and 
Zaborowski 2005). While some authors argue that the differences among national strategic 
cultures in Europe are large and persistent (Rynning 2003, Lindley-French 2002), others point 
out dynamics, which may lead to a process of convergence towards a European strategic 
culture (Howorth 2002, Cornish and Edwards 2001). This debate has not been decided yet, 
because of a lack of direct empirical evidence about cultural change but also because of 
unresolved questions regarding the use of strategic culture in applied research. The leading 
theoretical literature on strategic culture (Gray 1999a, Gray 1999b, Johnston 1995, Johnston 
1999) is of limited utility, because it fails to sufficiently disaggregate the notion of strategic 
culture and provides little guidance on how to empirically analyse strategic culture in a 
contemporary context.  
The paper makes the case for distinguishing four types of strategic norms as interrelated 
components of a broader strategic culture, which shapes corridors of normal behaviour and 
illuminates key motives for strategic choice. It argues that some of these norms may be less 
resistant to change and more widely shared across territorially bounded security communities 
than commonly assumed. Focusing on the case of Europe after the end of the cold war, the 
paper argues that all four of these strategic norms are subject to three distinct mechanisms of 
social learning affecting national elites and societies in varying ways. The paper puts forward 
a number of hypotheses about the direction of this change and identifies areas of strong 
convergence, particularly with respect to international authorisation, preferred mode of 
cooperation and goals for the use of force. This study cannot provide definitive empirical 
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answers, but makes the case for testing the learning mechanisms and their effects through 
transnational collaboration on a comparative research design.  
 
2. The European Strategic Culture Debate 
 
Member states of the European Union (EU) adopted in 2003 the first ever European Security 
Strategy (ESS). It sets out an analysis of and response to the most salient security threats the 
Union is facing (European Council 2003), even if some ambiguities and gaps remain 
(Heisbourg 2004). The intangible of ‘European strategic culture’ has been introduced into the 
debate to highlight that the successful implementation of the ESS will depend not just on the 
creation of the requisite military and civil capabilities, but also on a sufficiently shared pool of 
norms, beliefs and ideas regarding the means and ends of defence policy. The ESS itself calls 
for the development of ‘a strategic culture, which fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, 
robust intervention’ (European Council 2003, p. 12). European strategic culture in this 
rudimentary form is depicted as a kind of common mindset to allow the successful 
implementation of certain types of ESDP actions. Cornish and Edwards define it ‘as the 
institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the 
accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with general 
recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities’ 
(Cornish and Edwards 2001, p. 587). This is not to downplay the centrality of member states’ 
policy choices and their implementation for the performance of ESDP given that each 
member has a veto under the decision-making rules and considering that any military mission 
of the EU will have to rely on national military contingents. These national policy choices are 
shaped by collective strategic cultures, which are themselves the results of long and diverse 
historical experiences. This does not mean that all kinds of divergence between national and 
European strategic cultures are harmful for the evolution of ESDP given that the EU is in 
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many respects a different political entity than any of its component parts. Nevertheless, under 
the current voting rules a successful European strategic culture would need to capture and 
draw upon similar norms, ideas and practices regarding security and defence policy and the 
legitimate use of force. This would require a substantial degree of convergence in national 
strategic norms so that a common platform for action can be found.  
Normative convergence can have many faces. We could see, for instance, a trend towards a 
limited pacific or only self-defence oriented European strategic culture, which would mean 
that authorisation is protracted, highly dependent on the support of other non-EU countries 
and the UN, as well as limited to certain types of situations and conflicts. Conversely, we 
could envisage convergence as the gradual transformation or upgrading of particularly the 
more pacific or defensive-minded countries towards more activism in the pursuit of their 
goals, which would entail an expansion of the legitimate ends of ESDP coupled with an 
increasing lowering of the norms regarding the international legitimisation and domestic 
authorisation of the use of military force. Finally, convergence may be conceived of as a 
process that affects all strategic cultures and pushes them towards a kind of median or hybrid 
set of norms, which are then becoming increasingly institutionalised and internalised. In the 
current academic discussion (Freedman 2004, pp. 22-23) as well as in the Solana report 
(European Council 2003), convergence is implicitly conceived of in the sense of upgrading 
towards ‘a more active’ strategic culture presented by countries such as France and the UK, 
which form an attractive core or ‘model’ of robust strategic cultures for others to follow or at 
least not to oppose (Everts et al. 2004). The question is whether national strategic cultures are 
converging towards a greater activism in the pursuit of security and value goals, a higher 
preparedness to use coercive means and accept risks, lower thresholds for the authorisation of 
force, and a higher acceptance of the European Union as the legitimate vehicle for conduct of 
defence policies (see below for typology of norms). This would not exclude the possibility 
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that governments’ can disagree over the relative priority of threats (Kirchner and Sperling 
2002) or lack the political will to act for overriding domestic reasons, including the ability to 
finance military operations (Keukeleire 2002).  
What is the empirical evidence that convergence of strategic cultures is actually taking place? 
On the one side of the debate are those who highlight important EU decisions on institutions, 
policies and capabilities and argue that they are in fact based on growing ideational and 
cognitive homogeneity (Howorth, 2002; Cornish & Edwards, 2001). On the other side are 
those who maintain that Europeans still disagree over key issues concerning the analysis of 
threats and the application of military force, raising the risk that the EU will fail to act 
effectively when faced with grave threats or crisis (Lindley-French, 2002; Rynning, 2003). A 
particular strand of the more sceptical position is the edited volume by Longhurst and 
Zaborowski (2005), which focuses on persistent differences in national strategic cultures to 
explain the ‘Old Europe - New Europe divide’ over Iraq. However, both sides of the debate 
exhibit a certain tendency to treat ideas and norms as self-evident or easily deducible from the 
behaviour and policies of governments within the EU; instead, they should be studied 
empirically at the level of both national elites and public on the basis of a unified comparative 
research design. This has not been done so far with the exception of some smaller studies. 
Heiselberg (2003) for example investigated the impact of the Kosovo war as a ‘formative 
moment’ on the narratives underpinning national strategic cultures in the UK, Sweden and 
Germany. Howorth has explored how coordinative and communicative discourses may be 
relevant to understanding the changes in the ideas underpinning ESDP (Howorth 2004). In 
another work, he has pointed to a number of powerful ‘endogenous and exogenous historical 
forces’ (2003, p. 9), most notably the aspirations of Europeans to accomplish political union 
and the increasing unwillingness of the US to foot the bill for European security free-riding 
after the end of the cold war. While such an account has its merits when written by an expert 
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with profound knowledge of the policy area and its evolution, it leaves room for a more 
rigorous theoretical approach to explaining the key dynamics at play and probe them 
empirically with an appropriate methodology. 
3. Conceptualising and Unpacking Strategic Culture(s) 
The intensifying debate about prospects for the emergence of a European strategic culture 
lacks cohesion because the core concept is contested in the broader theoretical literature. The 
key point of contention among so-called first and third generation theorists of strategic culture 
is whether their referent object of study should be used to try ‘to understand’ (Gray 1999b) or 
‘to explain’ (Johnston 1995) the strategic behaviour of states’ in security and defence affairs. 
Alastair Iain Johnston sees strategic culture as a potentially important independent variable 
for explaining behaviour, ‘as an ideational milieu which limits behavioral choices’ (Johnston 
1995, p. 46). He argues from a Popperian understanding of social science that theories 
positing the influence of strategic culture on actions should be ‘falsifiable, or at least 
distinguishable from non-strategic culture variables’ (ibid. p. 45) so that their comparative 
advantage to other theories of strategic choice, such as neorealism, can be ascertained (Glenn 
et al. 2004). To include behaviour in the definition of strategic culture as Colin Gray does, 
would in Johnston’s view overly inflate the notion and thereby deprive it of its explanatory 
value. Gray in contrast, conceptualises ‘culture as context’, which comprises and pervades 
behaviour of political actors, thus ‘going all the way down’ (Gray 1999a, Gray 1999b). He 
criticises Johnston’s approach for artificially separating what is part of a coherent whole and 
emphasises that culture is not a causal variable to be used for prediction, but a context that 
helps us to understand the reasons and motivations of actors.  
I follow Gray in so far as ideas, beliefs and norms are not like independent variables used by 
neorealist theories such as the distribution of power capabilities. Actors do not start with a 
blank sheet of mind, when they are faced with a problem or an opportunity to act, but draw on 
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pre-existing and usually stable schemata, beliefs and ideas about the external world and 
deeply ingrained norms about appropriate behaviour (Checkel 2000, Olsen 2000). They 
cannot extract themselves and their potential utilitarian considerations from the cultural and 
social context in which they are embedded and their actions will always reflect this context. 
Johnston in his reply to Gray (Johnston 1999) effectively acknowledges the weakness of an 
overly atomistic approach in his earlier writing.  
Yet, this does not mean that an explanation of outcomes is not possible as exponents of 
modernist constructivism have argued (Adler 2002, Risse 2000, Schimmelfennig 2000, 
Checkel 1998, Katzenstein 1996a). Modernist constructivism does not seek to predict 
behaviour in a similar way as neorealism does but it can provide ‘reasons’ for action as 
Finnemore argues (2003, p. 15). She writes that ‘beliefs about legitimate intervention [for 
instance] constitute certain behavioural possibilities and, in that sense, cause them. Analysis 
of this type is less directed towards answering the question ‘why’ than the question ‘how’, or 
more specifically ‘how possible’ (ibid). We are dealing therefore with theories, which can tell 
us whether the strategic behaviour of collective actor ‘a’, is possible on the grounds of 
defending a norm ‘y’ against violation. Behaviour ‘z’, which is generally considered 
inappropriate, could still occur, but would have to be caused by other considerations and 
would be subject to tensions arising from political actors’ awareness of this norm violation. 
Finnemore argues for instance that the intervention of the United States in Somalia would 
have been inconceivable without the establishment of new norms in support of humanitarian 
intervention to help non-Christian, non-white peoples given the lack of strong geo-strategic or 
economic interests. ‘Understanding reasons for action’ can therefore be considered as part of 
the explanation (the ‘why-question’) and may even be used to analyse future trends if reasons 
for actions are evaluated in conjunction with countervailing forces. Hence, a better 
understanding of national strategic cultures in Europe will usually not be sufficient to predict 
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on its own how a given state will act in the context of ESDP. But these insights could be 
combined with other empirically informed values of other variables in order to rule out certain 
types of behaviour as very unlikely and others as possible or even probable given that 
strategic choice such as military intervention is often ‘caused’ by a mix of different factors. 
We can use our findings to map a corridor of ‘normal’ or ‘probable’ behaviour of states and 
integrate them into more comprehensive analyses of strategic choice.  
The second major question is how we can use strategic culture in applied research. Most 
definitions of strategic culture are quite broad and loose in so far as they incorporate 
references to beliefs, ideas, attitudes, world-views, collective memories, as well as practices, 
habits, traditions, or patterns of behaviour (Johnston 1995, Gray 1999a, Martinsen 2004, 
Heiselberg 2003, Longhurst 2004). Returning briefly to the debate between Gray and 
Johnston whether practices or behaviour can belong to such a definition, it would seem to me 
overly scholastic and nonsensical to re-define the meaning of a commonly used term such as 
culture in a way that deprives it of a key semantic component. The conceptual disadvantages 
of a broad definition of strategic culture can be overcome by focusing on specific normative, 
cognitive or ideational components to realise our modified explanatory aspirations, and to 
avoid over determining outcomes along the lines of national essentialism (‘The Germans 
cannot but act as Germans’). Having reviewed a number of definitions of strategic culture put 
forward not only by Gray and Johnston, but also by Martinsen (2003) and Longhurst (2004), I 
propose to define strategic culture as comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived 
norms, ideas, and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors 
and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of 
options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals.  The distinguishing features 
of this definition are threefold: Firstly, it makes explicit reference to norms in order to connect 
with the sociological institutionalist writing of authors such as Katzenstein, Finnemore, or 
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Checkel. Secondly, the definition reflects an understanding that norms, ideas and practices are 
not isolated variables, but should be rather seen as interrelated elements of and derived from 
an overarching identity narratives of a given community in its relation to the outside world. 
Finally, this definition highlights that strategic culture can be quite heterogeneous and 
contested within societies in just the same way as national identity narratives are. We are thus 
faced with a majoritarian conception of culture in the sense of a national framework culture, 
which can be subject to both internal and external forces of contestation and change.  
The real problem with the concept of strategic culture is not so much one of definition than 
one of empirical application. At the aggregate level strategic culture is simply too broad a 
notion to explain much; it needs to be ‘unpacked’ into its most important normative, 
ideational and behavioural components. Given the difficulties of analysing all aspects of 
strategic culture simultaneously, I suggest to focus on what Katzenstein has called 
constitutive and regulative norms as the most persistent and most deeply rooted aspects of 
national strategic cultures. Katzenstein conceptualises norms as social facts, which define 
standards of appropriate behaviour and express actors’ identities (Katzenstein, 1996a, p. 19). 
Norms in this sense are arguably the least volatile components of strategic culture. They do 
not change easily in different situations, but are deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective 
expectations of what is appropriate behaviour.  
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Table 1: Scalable Norms on the Means and Ends of the Use of Force 
Strategic 
Norms 
Degree of Activism in the Use of Force 
Lower                                                                                           Higher 
Goals for the 
Use of Force 
Defence against 
immediate attack 
on home territory 
Defending 
groups/nationals 
abroad against 
security threats 
Promoting Values, 
Beliefs or Ideas 
abroad 
Extra-territorial 
expansion of 
political and/or 
cultural control 
The Way in 
which Force 
Used 
Reactive, 
proportionate 
Activist, low in-
group & low out-
group casualties 
Activist, low in-
group & high out-
group casualties 
Aggressive, 
disproportionate 
towards in- and 
out groups 
Preferred 
Mode of 
Cooperation 
Neutrality       
(non-interference) 
Cooperation on 
the basis of laws, 
treaties and rules 
Cooperation of 
choice among 
preferred partners 
Unilateralism 
(Preference for 
acting alone) 
Threshold for 
Domestic & 
International 
Authorisation 
High Domestic 
High International 
High Domestic 
Low International 
Low Domestic 
High International 
Low Domestic, 
Low International 
 
Hence, in order to better describe the normative components of strategic culture, I propose a 
conceptual framework with four main scalable norms, which can take different values in 
different national settings (see Table 1 above). For instance, countries such as Finland or 
Ireland tend to consider the use of military force only in very restricted circumstances if used 
for the defence against immediate attacks on the home-territory, but not for the military 
defence of foreign peoples against direct threats abroad nor for the promotion of particular 
beliefs and value abroad. France and Britain in contrast are quite prepared to consider the use 
of force as legitimate to defend certain values and beliefs. The second dimension concerns the 
way in which force is used. At one end of the spectrum, the use of force is fundamentally to 
be avoided and only used as a last resort and with maximum restraint in the event of a direct 
attack. Some of these views can be found in Austria and parts of contemporary Germany. One 
can also distinguish between states, who go out of their way to protect their own forces from 
losses, but have little problems on inflicting maximum harm on ‘enemies’, while others, such 
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as Nazi-Germany or Imperial Japan accepted the sacrifice of millions of their own as well as 
of foreign citizens to promote certain belief-systems or territorial expansion. Thirdly, the use 
of force may be conditioned by beliefs about how the state survives in international affairs, 
namely whether the use of force should be conditioned by rules and laws of military alliances 
or supranational organisations, or whether this very step would bring it into harms way. The 
latter belief is particularly strong in Sweden and Ireland, while the former can be found in 
Germany (with a European vocation) and Britain (with a US linkage). Finally, one can 
analyse the degree to which the legitimacy of the use of force depends on high or low 
thresholds of domestic and/or international authorisation. For instance, there are those 
countries, such as Germany, which traditionally demanded a very high degree of both 
domestic (parliamentarian and public opinion) and international assent (from peers and the 
UN) before the use of force can be considered legitimate, whereas American and French 
strategic cultures provide the President as the commander-in-chief with substantially more 
domestic and international leeway. 
The focus on strategic norms along the scale of activism as suggested by Heiselberg (2003, 
pp. 12-13) has the added advantage of doing away with the overly rigid dichotomies used in 
much of the literature on strategic culture. Sten Rynning speaks of a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ 
European strategic culture, where the latter would allow the EU to prevail in zero-sum 
conflict situations, in which opposing actors need to be defeated rather than persuaded to 
change their views, interests and behaviour (2003, p. 484). In my view ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ are 
in my too crude and moreover normatively biased measurements to make a distinction. 
Moreover, such a single dichotomy between weak and strong does not adequately reflect the 
potential for incoherence within a give strategic cultures, arising from contradictions and 
trade-offs between different norms, such as, for instance, norms regarding cooperation within 
an particular alliance expanding its scope and norms concerning the use of force for territorial 
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defence only. Howorth (2002, p. 89) uses at least six dichotomies to highlight differences 
between national security cultures in Europe (allied/neutral, Atlanticist/Europeanists, power 
projection/territorial defence, nuclear/non-nuclear military/civilian instruments, large/small 
states, weapons providers/consumers). Yet, not all of these criteria, especially the last two, 
can be linked clearly to norms, ideas or beliefs as cultural components. The present approach 
of focusing on different norms as spanning continuums allows researchers not only locate 
distinct national strategic cultures according to different normative dimensions, but also be 
more open to changes arising from forces of change. 
4. How Do Strategic Norms Change? Outlining Three Learning Mechanisms 
It is true that the scientific appeal of the notion of strategic culture and their underpinning 
norms is linked to their relative resilience vis-à-vis the forces of history. Kerry Longhurst for 
instance argues that strategic cultures ‘arise gradually over time, through a unique and 
protracted historical process. Strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the 
era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and 
influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical 
junctures in that collective’s experiences’ (Longhurst 2004). One would not be surprised 
therefore that strategic norms can change over three centuries at a global scale as Martha 
Finnemore (2003) argued by focusing on interventions to collect debts, for humanitarian 
reasons or to safeguard peace and order. But since this study is interested in changes over a 
shorter time frame and in a smaller part of the world, differences between the strategic 
cultures of countries are important, and so are the forces that may explain how these cultures 
change vis-à-vis each other. Generally, cognitive frameworks of a political community in 
international and security affairs are established through complex socialisation processes, 
most dramatically in the societal interpretations and identity transformations in the aftermaths 
of defeats in war as epitomised by the cases of Germany and Japan (Hondrich 1992, 
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Katzenstein 1996a). The key question is whether we can identify also other mechanisms, 
events or long-term developments that can alter the underlying norms and ideas in a similar, 
perhaps more gradual way, than the direct experience of full blown war sweeping the home 
territory. The following section will set out three learning mechanisms and their impact on 
one or more of the four types of strategic norms. It will also explore briefly the factors, which 
may help to explain which European countries are likely to be affected most strongly by these 
pressures. The three mechanisms may not be powerful enough to change the overarching 
security narratives or defence identities of a given country in the short term, but they can 
make them less stable and open new avenues for policy-makers. The theoretical framework 
has been informed by exploratory empirical research mainly through practitioner interviews 
and content analysis on four country cases (Britain, Germany, France, and Poland) but will 
need to be investigated much more extensively by future comparative research and 
collaboration.  
4.1 Learning Through Changing Threat Perceptions: The Impact of the Demise and 
Transformation of the Soviet Union  
Early realists saw the lust for power as a basic human condition and a powerful psychological 
explanation of military strategy (Morgenthau 1948), whereas later realist thinking focused on 
fear for one’s own survival in a dangerous environment as an even more powerful factor 
(Waltz 1979). Stephen M. Walt captured this new emphasis in realist thought when he studied 
how threat perceptions come about and in doing so ventured into the ideational territory of 
social constructivism (Walt 1996). Threat perceptions of a given security community 
regarding another state, organisation, or social group, can arise from a wide range of different 
factors. Not counting the experience of direct attack, threat perceptions are themselves linked 
to perceptions regarding (i) incompatibilities between societal and political values, ideas and 
norms, (ii) communications and activities of hostile intent, (iii) and the capability to actually 
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inflict harm on a significant level. All of these factors can reinforce or neutralise each other. 
In periods of high ideological polarisation between states, enemy capabilities can be 
massively overestimated as research on the ‘missile gap’ demonstrates. Societal perceptions 
of shared norms and values of other countries and groups make processes of enemy-image 
building much more difficult and underpin theories of democratic peace. Thirdly, without the 
realisation of hostile intent even the persistence of substantial military capabilities does not 
seem to fuel sufficiently high threat perceptions. Contrary to some realist predictions 
(Mearsheimer 1990), inter-state rivalry has not re-surfaced in Europe after the end of the cold 
war, because ideational incompatibilities and hostile intent are absent. Fears of the Soviet 
Union and later on the Russian federation eased so dramatically after 1989 not because the 
Red Army had vanished over night, but because a new leadership and political reforms had 
dramatically weakened perceptions of hostile intent and increased awareness of common 
values and norms.  
Strategic norms are not independent of changing threat perceptions; they can be influenced 
and are often sustained by lingering fear of foreign others. If the perception of being 
threatened grips the national consciousness over a prolonged period of time, strategic thinking 
and norms will adapt to provide a cognitive shield against these fears. The stronger the fears 
of a particular threat, the stronger and more resilient protective norms are likely to be. The 
exploratory research indicates that primarily norms concerning the goals and modes of 
cooperation for the use of force are affected. Depending on the type of threat normative 
adaptation can take different forms such as a strong commitment to territorial defence as the 
overriding purpose for the military, or a strong attachment to military alliances as the only 
protection against a vastly more powerful enemy. If the factors, which have given rise to these 
threat perceptions disappear or change rapidly, the dominant normative shields will not vanish 
immediately, but will become increasingly hollow and more vulnerable to external events and 
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crisis. A given security community’s threat perceptions are thus in the medium term a 
powerful vector of learning at both the elite and the societal level, thereby contributing to 
changes in strategic cultures.  
This is what has been happening in Europe since 1989. For much of the cold war period most 
European societies and elites were continuously afraid of the Soviet Union. The dramatic 
easing of fear among European states vis-à-vis the potential enemy in the East after 1989, has 
had a profound impact particularly on those national communities in the West with a 
relatively recent historical experience of the Red Army such as Germany, Austria and 
Finland. In the case of Germany, the cold war mindset led to a normative preference for 
strong Atlantic and multilateralist orientations and territorial defence based on conscription, 
whereas Finland and Austria saw different forms of neutrality as the best form of protection 
against the fears of a powerful and dangerous neighbour. The primary impact of the end of the 
cold war on Germany strategic culture concerned the norm of exclusively prioritising 
territorial defence, but took some time to materialise. Despite the radically changed security 
environment, it took more than 12 years until the country’s defence minister downgraded 
territorial defence from the status of the most important task of the armed force to ‘an 
important task’ (Giegerich 2004). Despite this shift, the German government defends the need 
for conscription even if long-term force planning is no longer based on this requirement.  
Other European countries less captured by the cold war mindset and fears such as France and 
Italy have found it much easier to move away from conscription and the premium placed on 
territorial defence. This observation is only partly true for many Central and Eastern European 
states and the Baltic States, mainly because their threat perceptions of the Russian Federation 
did not alter as radically as those of their counterparts in the West. NATO membership as a 
means of neutralising hostile capabilities is still a relatively recent experience, as are 
memories of hostile intent and actions on the part of Russia especially before, but also after 
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1989. Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland also see much more clearly 
incompatibilities between European values and norms problems and the state of Russia, 
increasingly prone to political authoritarianism, ingrained corruption and state control of 
strategic market assets. 
The second dimension of change concerned preferences for different modes of defence 
cooperation. Given that new perceptions of a territorial attack from a powerful state have yet 
to emerge in Europe after 1989, normative preferences for military alliances and US 
protection have weakened considerably and gradually call into question the nature of the 
relationship of European countries to the US and its institutional embodiment NATO. From 
the perspective of many West European countries, the US is no longer indispensable as a 
security provider and thus as a shield against fear. The surprising resilience of NATO despite 
the disappearance of its main enemy testifies to the resilience of strategic norms and their 
power to sustain large institutional structures in search of a purpose. However, the erosion of 
the strategic norms regarding security cooperation has continued and been accelerated over 
the last six years through instances of crisis learning in Kosovo and Iraq as outlined in more 
detail in the third mechanism. The more momentous change emanates, however, from shifts 
in US foreign and security policy brought about by a new republican administration and the 
watershed event of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers on 9/11. 
The United States’ national security strategy of 2002 (Bush 2002) claims authority for 
military action anywhere to pre-empt terrorist security threats. Multilateral institutions, 
international treaties and human rights law were disregarded and key European allies as well 
as NATO were sidelined in the decision-making process regarding the interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. European antipathy to US foreign policy went so far that a majority of 
53 percent of Europeans regarded its former protector and ally as ‘a threat to world peace’ 
according to a survey conducted shortly after the US-led invasion of Iraq (European 
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Commission 2003, p. 81). This phenomenon extended even to those countries, whose 
governments had supported the military mission (UK 55 percent and Spain 61 percent 
respectively). Only in Italy and Germany did a majority of citizens not share this assessment 
indicating that strategic norms regarding the US as a preferred partner in security matters are 
still influential. Central and Eastern European countries were not surveyed, but other surveys 
demonstrate that they show less antipathy to US foreign policy (EOS Gallup 2004). 
Finally, the question arises whether the events September 11th and the Madrid terrorist attack 
of 11 March have created new, powerful, and continuous threat perceptions vis-à-vis 
fundamentalist terrorism, which could support a more activist interpretation for the use of 
force to pre-empt threats as witnessed in the US. Survey data from 2002 show that despite the 
genuine shock and the outpouring of solidarity, Europeans felt much less affected by and 
vulnerable to al-Qaeda style of terrorism than the US (Worldviews 2002). Another survey 
shows that differences in threat perceptions among European countries are striking: In 
October 2003, 76 percent of citizens in Spain and the UK were afraid of terrorist attacks, 
while only 6 percent of the Finns and 10 percent of Austrians shared this assessment 
(European Commission 2003, p. 74). At the time of writing, it is unclear whether new forms 
of network terrorism can lead to changes in strategic norms, which match threat perceptions 
vis-à-vis the former USSR in strength and continuity. 
4.2 Learning Through Institutions: Socialising Effects of ESDP structures and 
committees 
The second learning mechanism arises from the ability of institutions and decision-shaping 
structures created at the supranational level to affect the norms held by delegated national 
officials through processes of social influence. Experiments in the field of social psychology 
have shown that groups, whether strongly institutionalised or ad-hoc, are in principle able to 
shift individual cognitions, feelings, and behaviour (Avermaet 2001, Pennington et al. 1999, 
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Smith and Mackie 2000). Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) 
established that individuals experience physiologically measurable stress when they discover 
that their attitudes, ideas and beliefs are inconsistent with what they perceive as the dominant 
norms of the group and will often take steps to resolve this inconsistency by changing their 
attitudes and perceptions. This process is called normative influence. Alternatively, 
individuals may change their views because they believe or are persuaded that the group’s 
dominant norms better reflect reality or are more appropriate, which is usually referred to as 
informational influence.  
Theorists of regional integration have drawn on, adapted and applied these insights to argue 
that the participation of national civil servants in EU institutions and committees can set in 
motion socialisation dynamics, which can overcome gaps in mutual trust and world views 
among national representative, thereby weakening the ideational influence of their ministries 
in the capitals. Neo-functionalist have called this process ‘actor socialisation’, ‘cultivated 
spill-over’, ‘engrenage’, or ‘cognitive Europeanization’ (Schmitter 2003, Lindberg 1971, p. 
284, Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, p. 119). They focus primarily on the impact of the 
numerous EU level committees, task forces and working groups, which are woven together by 
complex systems of consultation, coordination and information exchange. Europeanising 
social influence increases with intensity and length of exposure and varies across different 
types of committees as well as between policy fields (Trondal and Veggeland 2000, Hooghe 
1998). We would expect to find strong social influence within committees and institutions, 
which meet frequently and extensively, whose members are based in Brussels and/or are 
delegated permanently, which are put in charge of new policy initiatives and where group 
size, shared professional background and confidentiality allow for intimate discussions (cf. 
Checkel 2000). 
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The new European structures for decision-making in the field of security and defence meet 
many of these criteria for normative and informational influence and are considered capable 
to bring about a convergence in strategic thinking (Howorth 2002, Cornish and Edwards 
2001, Martinsen 2003). The case for convergence through institutionally induced learning 
rests, firstly, on the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and its support structures set-up 
under new provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and headed currently by Javier Solana. 
The second institutional innovation was in 2000 the setting up of the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC or COPS), the European Military Committee (EUMC), and the European 
Military Staff (EUMS) as catalysts for the evolution of ESDP. The PSC is the most senior 
committee and consists of officials from member states’ foreign offices at the rank of 
ambassadors, who are permanently placed in Brussels and meet at least twice a week to work 
for a full day on a heavy agenda. The largest and most capable member states as well as the 
institutional actors such as the Council Presidency and the Office of the High Representative 
wield considerable influence on shaping information flows, opinion papers, and agendas of 
these committees and many of the most sensitive issues are discussed over lunch or in more 
restricted settings. Interviews the authors conducted with PSC ambassadors and other high 
civil servants in the summer of 2004 show that this key committee has managed to develop an 
esprit de corps, a group-identity and common thinking revolving around the shared 
commitment to pioneering a ESDP, a high-level of mutual trust and an intimate understanding 
of each others positions.  
These findings indicate not only a growing acceptance for the EU as a framework for defence 
cooperation at the level of high officials, but also underline the power of such committees to 
exert conformity pressures on newcomers to support the overall thrust of ESDP. A number of 
officials from the old member states emphasised how cautious and indeed ‘well behaved’ the 
new members were. Conversely, representative from these new countries in the PSC realised 
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that they would be cast in the role of the isolated trouble-maker if they did not fall in line with 
the ways of operation, the use of language, and the overall thrust of ESDP. Of particular 
importance is normative influence with the policies and principles already agreed by the 
committee as one official from a new member state joining in 2004 said: ‘We have found out 
that you cannot just come with new ideas and proposals for change, they will just be 
dismissed as not-constructive. You always have to build on the language already agreed and 
seek to develop it in an evolutionary way’ (interview, September 2004, Brussels). The most 
notable effect of institutional socialisation was that the new member states dropped very 
quickly their serious objections against the EU as the appropriate framework for wide 
reaching defence cooperation in general and on issues such as the solidarity clause, 
battlegroups, or the defence agency in particular.  
But the PSC and its satellite committees do not only exert strong conformity pressures on new 
member states to accept the EU as the preferred mode for security cooperation, they are also 
supporting this new strategic norm by virtue of being platform and stimulus to real learning or 
mutual ‘education’ as another ambassador called it. Delegates from new member states 
acknowledged that persuasion through facts and strength of argument was taking place. ‘We 
can draw on the European reservoir of ideas to devise our own approach. Being part of the 
PSC sometimes makes you realise that their approach is actually better than what we 
considered as our national interest’ (interview, September 2004, Brussels). Persuasion can 
also take place through information overload as particularly smaller member states find it 
difficult to digest and shape the massive paper flow originating from Policy Unit, SITCEN, 
Commission, and the Presidency with their limited administrative resources and expertise. 
They also struggle to influence the agenda setting and opinion shaping within the ESDP 
structures because of their lack of military capabilities and real experience in missions as the 
main determinants of influence in hard security debates. One frequent focus for persuasion is 
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when influential PSC members, particularly the one from the UK, strive to convince the 
strongly US/NATO oriented member states that ESDP missions and capability goals are 
compatible with NATO and their obligations within it. Learning effects within these 
committees are then mediated to foreign and defence ministries as well as to military 
organisations of both old and new member states, some of which were initially very sceptical 
of attempts to pursue defence policy in a European context.  
One example of such multi-level influence affecting not only the new and the smaller member 
states was the role of ESDP structures in the production of the European Security Strategy, 
and thereby in re-defining goals for the use of force. According to my interviews, it was PSC 
ambassadors who came up with the idea for the European Security Strategy, sold it 
successfully to their Foreign Ministers (including the UK!), who then asked Solana to draft it. 
It was prepared within a small circle of high civil servants around Solana with some input 
from the PSC, discussed with external experts at three seminars, and finalised by the PSC in 
the formation of Political Directors. ESDP structures and actors had therefore had a key 
impact on the formulation of a document, which represents a substantial shift away from the 
‘civil power’ leitbild towards a Union that aims to develop autonomy in defence matters and 
considers the use of military force a legitimate option to tackle security threats. The ESS 
represents a departure in strategic thinking for the NATO oriented countries, who had 
previously resisted giving the EU a strong role in security and defence (the UK), as well as for 
those pacific and self-defence minded countries (Germany, Austria, Sweden), who had 
difficulties in signing up to a more activist use of force for the purpose of counteracting 
threats and defending human rights. ESDP structures can be also used proactively even by 
smaller countries. Sweden, for instance, has used the new institutions to re-shape the 
country’s strategic doctrine by exporting its strong preferences for a multi-lateral rule-based 
order to the EU level and importing notions of using military force for humanitarian purposes 
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as well as watering down its neutrality attachment within a new European defence policy 
framework. 
4.3 Mediatised Crises as Impetus to Societal Learning: Western Interventions from 
Bosnia to Iraq 
Threat perceptions and institutional socialisation do not usually bring about changes over the 
short term as societies respond rather slowly to changes in strategic thinking at the elite level. 
While elites can engage in moral advocacy they are under normal circumstances not able to 
single-handedly transform collectively held strategic norms. Yet, changes in national strategic 
cultures as well as the norms and narratives underpinning them can and do occur, either very 
gradually to the forces described above or more rapidly through events and crises, which act 
as ‘formative moments’ (Ringmar 1996, p. 85, Heiselberg 2003, p. 8) for the revision and 
reinterpretation of collective memory and beliefs. Existing cognitive schemata can be 
challenged either through a constant stream of similar, or a repetition of the same kind of 
discrepant information, or it can occur through the accumulated, high intensity exposure to 
such information. The direct experience of war can be one of the strongest causes of societal 
learning. It has the potential to challenge in fundamental ways deeply ingrained collective 
beliefs and identities (Hondrich 1992). Lessons learnt from violent conflict within and 
between states can run very deep in societies, especially when considering the effects of 
shattering defeats rather than those of dramatic victories as the examples of Japanese and 
German societies amply illustrate (Katzenstein 1996b, Hondrich 1992). The question is 
whether crises learning can also occur in cases where societies are not directly affected by 
attacks. In order to effectively challenge societal strategic norms without the direct experience 
of warfare, humanitarian and security crises need to be publicised and framed appropriately 
by the news media to overcome public awareness thresholds and to create empathy for the 
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victims of such violence. This kind of mechanism can be called mediatised crises learning and 
can affect all four of the strategic norms outlined in the previous section. 
After the end of the cold war, European societies and governments were confronted with new 
kinds of violent conflicts and crises. As frozen conflicts began to thaw in the absence of the 
disciplining effect of superpower rivalry, war did not come to an end, but suddenly took place 
on a smaller scale elsewhere, including the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. West European 
societies were largely unprepared not only to the fact that interethnic violence, mass rape and 
concentration camps could take place in their backyard, but were also shocked by the level 
and immediacy of exposure to pictures of shelling, barbed wire fences, and gruelling accounts 
of rape victims. This raised painful memories in many European countries of Nazi 
Lebensraumpolitik and notions of ethnic superiority that promulgated the extermination of 
other ethnicities or religious groups. Especially the German society was torn apart between 
the norm of never sending soldiers ‘out of area’ again - in Kosovo even without a UN 
resolution - and its moral mission to prevent ‘a second Auschwitz’ as German Foreign 
Minister Joseph Fischer framed it. But also the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lind reacted 
to the media coverage by re-framing this normative tension to that the goals for the use of 
force trump authorisation concerns: ‘Let us now add to the insights, Never again Auschwitz!, 
Never again a Cold War! and Never again Srebrenica! and one more: Never again Kosovo! 
But what is the most important is for these painful experience for Europe to be turned into 
political action (sic)’ (quoted by Heiselberg 2003, p. 18). The Bosnia experience of European 
impotence to prevent the massacre of Srebrenica was widely interpreted in Europe as a 
moment of collective shame and led also to heated discussions in Britain over the obligation 
to use military force to prevent atrocities (Meyer 2004). The thesis is therefore that the 
outbreak of violent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans supported by high level of media exposure 
challenged the more reactive and territorial defence-oriented national security cultures and 
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initiated a process of societal learning in a number of member states towards a more active 
role in security and defence (Heiselberg 2003). The mobilisation of public opinion through 
the news media was also a major factor to prompt political leaders to consider and actually 
use military force in new circumstances such as the NATO interventions in Bosnia in 1995 
and Kosovo of 1999. The Bosnia and Kosovo case prompted also profound changes in the 
norms governing the authorisation of force in the more pacific countries. In Germany, the 
Federal Constitutional Court was called-upon to clarify whether using German troops abroad 
in interventions could be legal. The answer of the Court and vigorous societal debates over 
the obligation to protect paved the way for German military contributions to Kosovo and 
Afghanistan.  
The conflict over Kosovo was not only significant in extending the scope for the use of force 
to counteract human rights violations and ethnic cleansing, but it brought also a lesson for 
norms relating to the way in which force is used. It emerges from surveys many Europeans 
societies would have preferred a different kind of military campaign to the one the NATO 
pursued. The US was under considerable criticism for targeting of bridges and other 
infrastructure in Serbia, which led to many civilian deaths, rather than engaging the Serb 
forces directly with ground troops and accepting the risk of more casualties among NATO 
forces. Media coverage also focused on the lack of European military capacities, its 
dependence on US intelligence and its limited influence on US decision-making on how the 
air campaign was to be conducted. However, the case demonstrates also persistent intra-
European differences regarding norms on the means defence policy. While German and partly 
also French media commentators would demand an end of the bombing campaign without the 
use of ground troops and a return to diplomacy, left-of-centre newspapers in Britain like the 
Guardian called for deployment of grounds troops as the only effective means to end the 
violence, even if this meant substantially higher numbers of own casualties (Meyer 2004). 
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The main ideational impact of the invasion of Iraq was at the societal level to increase support 
for a European role in defence policy and to weaken support for cooperation with the United 
States as the Transatlantic Trends study of 2004 demonstrates (EOS Gallup 2004). In contrast 
to the invasion targeted at removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the US-led invasion 
of Iraq found very little support among Europeans (European Commission 2003). One key 
reason was the lack of a second United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC) resolution, which 
would have shifted opinion substantially in favour of the invasion in most European countries 
(Worldviews 2002, EOS Gallup 2004, p. 13). Iraq has thus reinforced the centrality of 
international authorisation for the use of force and demonstrated that the violation of one 
norm can impact also on the preference for a particular mode of defence cooperation. The 
normative repercussions of going to war against a majority in the UNSC were further 
reinforced by the US strategy of assembling coalitions of the willing with considerable 
pressure and financial incentives and thereby dividing Europeans against themselves. This 
deepened the post-cold war lesson in substantial parts of societal public opinion particularly 
in Western Europe that the US could no longer be trusted to listen to European concerns and 
act in their security interests. Furthermore, the Iraq crises did not de-legitimise the case for 
humanitarian intervention, but can be seen as undermining public acceptance of the use of 
force to avert military threats given the apparent failure to find any weapons of mass 
destruction. Even though the outcome of the transition process in Iraq is not clear at the time 
of writing, the experience of widespread insurgency and sectarian warfare in the aftermath is 
unlikely to have shifted European strategic norms at the societal level towards a more activist 
interpretation of the use of force for the pursuit of freedom. 
5. Combined Trends of Normative Convergence and their Implications 
The previous section looked at the impact of three learning mechanisms on strategic norms 
and specified, which type(s) of the four norms would be most affected and in what way. What 
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has been missing is a combined assessment of these changes in the light of the convergence 
thesis. This final section aims to do that by advancing four hypotheses about the extent and 
direction of the convergence process, which will need to be validated by further longitudinal 
and comparative research.  The appropriate methodology will vary with the different learning 
mechanism, for instance, public discourse analysis and surveys for analysing mediatised crisis 
learning, participant observation and qualitative interviews for institutional socialisation, and 
self-report questionnaires backed up by interviews and surveys for the analysis of changing 
threat perceptions. 
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Table 2: Overview of Learning Mechanisms and Their Expected Impact 
 
Vectors of 
change 
Causal 
mechanism 
Affected 
Norms 
Direction of Impact Intervening 
Variables 
for Impact 
 
Threat 
Perceptions 
 
Demise of perceptions 
of Soviet threat after 
1989, reinforced by 
US foreign policy 
shifts 
Goals for the Use 
of Force 
 
Preferred Mode of 
Cooperation 
Downgrading of exclusive 
commitment to territorial 
defence  
Weakened attachment to 
NATO / the US  
 
Former front-
line states in the 
West 
 
 
Institutional 
socialisation 
 
 
Socialisation effects 
arising from the 
creation of Brussels 
based ESDP 
structures and 
committees  
Preferred Mode of 
Cooperation 
 
Goals for the Use 
of Force 
Strengthening of trust in 
EU as defence actor, 
weakening of neutrality 
doctrines 
 
Expansion of legitimacy 
for the use of force for 
security and humanitarian 
ends 
Representatives 
from smaller, 
neutral and 
newly acceded 
countries 
 
Countries with 
strong 
US/NATO 
attachment 
 
 
 
Mediatised 
crisis 
learning 
 
Crises leading to 
Western Interventions 
in the cases of: 
a) Bosnia 
b) Kosovo 
c) Iraq 
Goals for the Use 
of Force 
 
 
Authorisation 
 
Way in which 
force is used 
 
 
Preferred Mode of 
Cooperation 
Cases a) & b) expanded 
legitimacy for use of force 
to protect ethnic groups 
from violence 
Cases a) & b) lowered 
domestic thresholds for 
authorisation of force 
Case b) strengthened 
norms regarding restraint 
of force against civilian 
targets 
Cases b) & c)  rising 
support for EU as 
preferred defence 
cooperation framework 
Formerly pacific 
or neutral 
countries with 
formerly high 
authorisation 
thresholds 
 
 
Western 
European 
countries with 
formerly strong 
attachment to 
the US/NATO 
 
1. Effects on Goals for the Use of Force: Converging Attitudes on Humanitarian 
Intervention abroad: Because of fading threat perceptions regarding direct attacks from an 
ideationally hostile superpower, the trend towards a de-prioritisation of territorial defence is 
expected to continue, particularly in countries such as Germany and Finland, which had felt 
most vulnerable to Soviet attacks over decades. Mediatised crises involving interethnic 
violence in the Balkans have filled this psychological breathing space and instigated over time 
a consensus that the use military means abroad can be legitimate for the purpose of protecting 
 27
vulnerable ethnic groups against attacks and thereby defending European values. This new 
consensus has been put into practice in Congo with the small-scale Artemis operation, which 
was hardly contested by public opinion. The socio-psychological effects of the Iraq conflict 
may not have fully matured yet, but point to a de-legitimization of the use of force for the 
promotion of democracy and freedom, particularly in those countries, which were not part of 
the US-led invasion force. The Madrid 4/11 attacks did not equal the 9/11 attacks in the US in 
terms of their impact on collective strategic norms in Europe regarding the pre-emptive use of 
force. Even at the elite level, the inclusion of military means to avert security threats remains 
extremely contested, and the final wording of the ESS suggest a strong preference to use only 
non-military means for dealing with non-immediate threats. 
 
2. The way in which force is used: Minimal consensus on restraint vis-à-vis foreign 
civilians. Crises learning in the case of US-led interventions in Kosovo and Iraq has solidified 
a European consensus concerning norms about the way force can be used, namely with 
maximum restraint against civilian targets and a preference to exhaust non-military means 
first. In Kosovo one could see, however, also the persistence of considerable normative 
differences among those European countries with considerable combat experience (Britain 
and France) and those without (Germany, Austria) on the use of ground troops and the 
acceptability of own casualties to reach the ultimate objectives. So far, EU military missions 
have not yet been a serious test of the degree to which different countries would support the 
initiation and continuation of combat operations with high casualties on both sides. Yet, 
participation of EU troops in out-of-area mission can be a stimulus to learning in this area, 
when overly restrictive and unclear rules of engagement hamper effective and coherent action 
of multi-national forces on the ground. According to studies of NATO and the Bundeswehr 
this has been case in March 2004 when KFOR was unable to counteract Albanian attacks on 
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the Serb minority population in Kosovo in March 2004 (Carstens 2004). Whether such 
failures are an indication of persistent differences in strategic norms or whether they will lead 
to learning beyond expert circles is unclear. 
 
3. Effects on the Authorisation of Force: Solidifying Consensus on Multilateralism and 
International Law: Changes in threat perceptions after the cold war and the effects of 
mediatised crisis learning have solidified the consensus on the thresholds for international 
authorisation, either through international law or the United Nations Security Council. This 
can be partly seen as a counterbalancing of the extended interpretation of norms regarding 
humanitarian intervention and steps taken by some countries to lower their domestic 
thresholds to allow for out-of-area missions in the first place. With regard to the domestic 
authorisation of the use force, a genuine process of convergence from both ends of the scale 
seems to be under way as constitutional caveats concerning the use of force are being lowered 
in some countries, while those states with very low thresholds (commander-in-chief model) 
move towards a greater oversight role for parliaments. There is also discernible pressure from 
some elite actors to strengthen European level accountability mechanisms, especially the 
powers of the European Parliament to scrutinise the High Representative. 
 
4. Effects on the Preferred Mode of Defence Cooperation: Fading Attachment to 
Neutrality as well as to NATO. The decline of the Soviet threat has weakened European 
societies’ attachment to neutrality as well as to defence cooperation through the US/NATO. 
While substantial ideational differences over this issue remain at the elite level, a considerable 
alienation from the US as the only or preferred ally has set in at the societal level. The 
common meeting ground for these opposing trends is the growing support for the European 
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Union as an actors in security and defence matters, which has been brought about through the 
combined impact of institutional socialisation and the negative experience of European 
influence on US decision-making and action in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. Moreover, 
European defence cooperation provides neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland with a 
normatively accepted outlet for pursuing the defence of values outside the framework of a 
military alliance. One would expect the process of destabilisation and re-framing of neutrality 
norms to extend eventually also to those countries such as Austria and Ireland, where 
neutrality is firmly embedded in national identity narratives.  
 
These four hypotheses of outcomes are clearly preliminary until more comprehensive and 
detailed empirical data regarding processes of normative changes becomes available. Yet, if 
the causal mechanism and their effects can be confirmed, the contribution to the convergence 
debate is clear. Normative convergence is most notable in the de-prioritisation of territorial 
defence, the legitimacy of intervention for humanitarian ends, international authorisation by 
the UN, and a growing attachment to the EU as the appropriate framework for defence 
cooperation. Differences remain in the area of using force abroad to pre-empt security threats 
to the home territory, attachment to the US/NATO context, and, most notably, the 
acceptability of casualties arising from the way in which force is used. The second important 
finding is that normative convergence affects particularly but not only the more pacific, 
neutral or defensive strategic cultures. British and French strategic cultures are also under 
adaptation pressure with regard to the preferred mode of cooperation through crisis learning, 
the demise of the Soviet threat, and to a lesser degree institutional socialisation. Convergence 
is thus not simply the process of approximating the British or the French strategic mind-set, 
but a process of hybridisation of strategic cultures, a gradual ironing out of differences.  
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The implications for ESDP and its ideational framework the European Security Strategy are 
both positive and negative. They are positive in so far as the overall drive towards closer 
European cooperation in defence matters enjoys broad societal support and at the elite level 
there has been an easing of principled concerns particularly in the new member states over 
using the EU as an important if not preferred framework for security cooperation. In addition, 
learning mechanisms have solidified a broad commitment to a strong role for the UN and 
multilateralism as well as an emphasis on wielding non-military means more effectively. The 
normative foundations for the pre-emptive use of force seem still fragile, as does the basis for 
a common approach to the way in which force is used if the risk of casualties is high. 
Especially, the last factor remains the Achilles heel of the ESDP and would require additional 
learning at the level of military organisations and national publics. This kind of learning could 
only arise from experiences with missions of national troops in hostile settings, most notably 
in Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan. In sum, there is much reason for the EU and individual 
states to be very careful about the missions and goals they want to undertake in order to avoid 
the risk of political fall-out and public backlash. Erring on the side of caution may be difficult 
in the face of strong public calls for action and the dynamism of unfolding events, but it may 
be crucial for building up confidence that the EU can be effective once it decides to act. 
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